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SPECIFICITY OR DISMISSAL: THE IMPROPER
EXTENSION OF RULE 9(B) TO NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION AS A DEPRIVATION OF
PLAINTIFFS’ PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Julie A. Cook*
INTRODUCTION
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 9(b),1 applicable to claims of
“fraud or mistake,” sets too high a pleading standard for plaintiffs to meet when ex-
tended to negligent misrepresentation claims. Rule 9(b), or “heightened pleading,”2
for this line of claims may constitute a deprivation of a plaintiff’s due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The information necessary to satisfy the standard—
the circumstances underlying the claim, including the who, what, where, when, and
how—may be impossible to obtain at the outset of a case. In the event that the court
dismisses the complaint, the application of the Rule might prevent a recourse for
which the substantive law allows. When justifications for heightened pleading are
not fairly balanced with the burden on the plaintiff, as is the case for negligent mis-
representation claims, courts should reject the application of the Rule in lieu of Rule 8
notice pleading.3 Courts’ extension of heightened pleading requirements to non-fraud-
based claims is contrary to both the purpose of the FRCP—allowing for liberal plead-
ing and the perseverance of claims4—and to due process of law under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Negligent misrepresentation is not fraud-based, and it
differs essentially from the tort of fraud.
This Note examines the current federal circuit court split on the application of
Rule 9(b) to negligent misrepresentation claims, the inconsistency with which the
Rule is applied, and the lack of clarity on the tort of negligent misrepresentation, all
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, William & Mary School of Law; B.A., 2011, magna cum laude,
Clemson University. I would like to thank the Editorial Board and Staff Members for their
dedication to the Bill of Rights Journal and for their thoughtful and thorough editing and cite
checking. I would also like to thank my family for supporting me in everything that I do.
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
2 Id.
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
4 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (“Such simplified ‘notice pleading’ is made possible by the
liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules
to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly
the disputed facts and issues.”).
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combined to constitute a deprivation of procedural due process rights for claimants
of the tort. Part I establishes the federal pleading rules, noting the difference be-
tween ordinary notice pleading and heightened pleading and the implications of Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly5 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.6 Part I also addresses the ordinary
procedures following a pleading the court or a defendant finds unsatisfactory. Part II
reviews the tort of negligent misrepresentation as compared to the tort of fraudulent
misrepresentation, including the history of the tort, important court decisions in its
formation, and the unique elements of the torts. Part III conducts an analysis of the
current circuit court split regarding the applicable pleading requirement. Part IV re-
futes the traditional justifications for heightened pleading when applied to negligent
misrepresentation claims. Part V introduces these arguments in a Fifth Amendment
procedural due process framework, analogizing plaintiffs’ situation to that of pro se
litigants. Part VI revisits the difficulties plaintiffs have faced when pleading negli-
gent misrepresentation under the requirements of Rule 9(b), considering the unique
elements of the tort and the common conflation of the Rule. Part VII notes that judi-
cial discretion in granting leave to amend plaintiffs’ complaints is insufficient to
protect the critical procedural due process rights at stake. Part VIII discusses a dan-
gerous future for plaintiffs due to the historical extension of Rule 9(b) to non-fraud-
based claims and the increasing strictness in the application of the Rule itself, calling
for limitation of the Rule.
I. PLEADING RULES
A. Notice Pleading vs. Heightened Pleading
FRCP Rule 8(a)(2) is the standard pleading requirement known as “notice
pleading,” governing the majority of civil law claims.7 Rule 8 provides, in part:
(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must
contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s ju-
risdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim
needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and
5 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
6 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
7 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading,
45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 990–91 (2003) (“Under the Federal Rules, a complaint would serve the
single function of providing notice of the claim asserted. . . . For the drafters, this meant notice
of the general nature ‘of the case and the circumstances or events upon which it is based.’”).
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(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in
the alternative or different types of relief.8
Rule 9(b) requires heightened pleading for claims of fraud or mistake, stating,
“Fraud or Mistake; Conditions of Mind. In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”9
Courts have established that the circumstances constituting the fraud or mistake
include the time and place which the false representation(s) were made, the content
of the false misrepresentation(s), the identity of the defendant(s) who made them,
and the consequences of the misrepresentation(s).10 These questions have been analo-
gized to the “who, what, when, where, and how” of a newspaper story.11 Other courts,
however, have noted that nothing in Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff to specify date,
place, and time, but that focusing on the “particularity” language of the Rule is too
narrow an approach as to subject fraud claims to too strict a scrutiny.12 These courts
have instead suggested that “the requirements of Rule 9(b) are met when there is
sufficient identification of the circumstances constituting fraud so that the defendant
can prepare an adequate answer to the allegations.”13 Although there may be disagree-
ment regarding the requirements of Rule 9(b), the latter appears to be the majority
approach.14 In The Myth of Notice Pleading, Christopher M. Fairman states that
“[t]ypically, courts applying Rule 9(b) to fraud actions require the ‘circumstances
constituting the fraud’ to be pleaded with particularity, not the elements of fraud.”15
In addition, an obvious exception exists for the state of mind of the defendant, which
can be “averred generally.”16 In other words, it is sufficient to make “a general aver-
ment of intent unaccompanied by supporting factual allegations.”17
8 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
9 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
10 See Lawrence Nat’l Bank v. Edmonds, 924 F.2d 176, 180 (10th Cir. 1991).
11 DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990).
12 See Constitution Bank v. DiMarco, 155 B.R. 913, 918 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (“It has been held
that the purpose of Rule 9(b) is to place the defendant on notice of the precise misconduct
with which it is charged and to safeguard defendants against spurious charges of immoral
and fraudulent behavior. . . . [W]hile it is true that date, place and time allegations will pro-
vide precision, substantiation and notice, nothing in the rule requires them.”(citation omitted)).
13 Id.
14 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1297
(3d ed. 2013).
15 Fairman, supra note 7, at 1004.
16 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
17 Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1270 n.5 (10th Cir. 1989) (citation
omitted).
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B. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal
Although courts may not require a plaintiff to plead the elements of fraud with
particularity, according to Rule 8, a plaintiff still must show that he is entitled to
relief.18 After the Supreme Court’s rulings in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, this requires a plaintiff to provide enough factual information as
to raise his claim above the speculative level and into the plausible.19 As a result,
even though Rule 9(b) provides a necessary exception in that a plaintiff is not re-
quired to prove the mental state of a defendant, and, as Fairman explained, courts
have not required the elements of a tort to be stated with particularity, a plaintiff
must still allege a defendant’s knowledge and fraudulent intent generally and con-
vincingly.20 Without these elements, a claimant of fraud would not be entitled to
relief, demonstrating that, intrinsically, the unique elements of the tort require some
form of heightened pleading.21 In Setting the Standard: A Fraud-Based Approach
to Antitrust Pleading in Standard Development Organization Cases, James E. Abell
III explains the practical complications this poses for plaintiffs during pleading:
As with knowledge, Rule 9(b) exempts plaintiffs from having to
plead intent with specificity. Plaintiffs, however, must neverthe-
less provide enough factual detail to strongly support their alle-
gations of fraudulent intent. One way for plaintiffs to meet this
requirement is to provide evidence that the defendants stood to
benefit in some way from the fraud . . . . The key factor in many
cases is that the statements were carefully tailored to eliminate
the specific concerns preventing the plaintiff from entering into
the transaction. In looking for fraudulent intent, courts will often
closely scrutinize cases in which defendants only had one inter-
action with the plaintiffs. Because the defendants anticipate no
future dealings with the plaintiffs, they face fewer consequences
18 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
19 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009) (applying the heightened pleading standard
set forth in Twombly outside of antitrust cases); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
556 (2007) (adopting a “plausibility” standard for antitrust complaints). These cases abrogated
the standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, which required only a conceivable set of facts in sup-
port of a legal claim and allowed courts to dismiss a claim only when the plaintiff, beyond
a doubt, would be able to “prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.” 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
20 Fairman, supra note 7, at 991–92.
21 See id. at 999.
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if their misrepresentations are discovered and thus may have a
stronger motive to commit fraud.22
This interesting implication of plausibility in pleading may be a contributing
factor to courts’ uncertainty regarding Rule 9(b), as they have stretched to apply a
higher pleading standard than the Rule actually warrants.23
C. Motions, Defenses, and Leave to Amend
In the circumstance that a plaintiff fails to provide a pleading sufficient for the
defendant to be able to prepare a responsive pleading, a defendant may move for a
more definite statement under Rule 12(e).24 In negligence cases, this scenario arises
only in “unusual or complex factual settings.”25 The torts of negligent misrepresenta-
tions and fraud, which have elements, discussed later in this Note,26 that often require
plaintiffs to allege “complex factual settings,” would be a circumstance in which
Rule 12(e) would be invoked.27
If possible, a defendant will likely choose to present the defense through a
12(b)(6) motion.28 The claim will be dismissed if, when all facts are construed in
favor of the plaintiff and assumed to be true, the plaintiff failed “to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.”29 In allowing the maximum possible deference to plain-
tiff’s allegations, the Rule demonstrates a purpose to allow for liberal pleading.30
If the motion is granted, a plaintiff’s claim may still be saved. In the event that
a plaintiff’s pleading fails to pass muster under the applicable requirement, courts gen-
erally exercise their discretion to dismiss claims without prejudice, allowing plain-
tiffs leave to amend.31 “[U]nder Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), [a] plaintiff should be granted
22 See James E. Abell III, Setting the Standard: A Fraud-Based Approach to Antitrust
Pleading in Standard Development Organization Cases, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1601, 1607
(2008) (citations omitted).
23 See infra Part VIII.
24 “A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably
prepare a response.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e).
25 “[A] more definite statement serves no useful purpose in automobile accident cases and
similar routine civil litigation, especially in view of the availability of comprehensive dis-
covery.” WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, at § 1249.
26 See infra Part II.
27 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, at § 1249; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e).
28 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
29 Id.
30 Id. But see Jason G. Gottesman, Comment, Speculating As to the Plausible: Pleading
Practice After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 17 WIDENER L.J. 973, 974 (2008) (suggesting
a flexible plausibility standard for pleading which solves the confusion created by Twombly).
31 See infra Part VI.
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leave to amend his complaint to plead [his] claims with sufficient specificity.”32 The
Rule provides that, in a matter of course, a plaintiff may amend his complaint within
twenty-one days after serving it, twenty-one days after receiving a responsive plead-
ing, or twenty-one days after service of a Rule 12(b), (e), or (f) motion.33 For all
other amendments, the Rule states the following: “[A] party may amend its pleading
only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should
freely give leave when justice so requires.”34 This Note will discuss courts’ consider-
ation of when “justice so requires” and the sufficiency of this procedure in Part VII.
II. ELEMENTS OF THE TORTS
A. History of the Tort Through the Restatement
The tort of negligent misrepresentation historically developed out of circum-
stances resulting in physical injury, or the branch of tort law known as product lia-
bility.35 This influence can be seen in the 1934 Restatement of Torts, which primarily
defined the tort of negligent misrepresentation in the context of bodily harm.36 The
Second Restatement adapted Section 311 as follows:
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is
subject to liability for physical harm caused by action taken by
the other in reasonable reliance upon such information, where
such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put
in peril by the action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reason-
able care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.37
With the advent of more sophisticated business relationships came the extension
of the tort of negligent misrepresentation into its more modern application, which
32 FED. R. CIV. P. 12; FED. R. CIV. P. 15; Gunningham v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., No. 07-
cv-02538-REB-KLM, 2008 WL 4377451 (D. Colo. Sept. 19, 2008).
33 FED. R. CIV. P. 12; FED. R. CIV. P. 15.
34 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).
35 For an introductory understanding of the common law development of liability for
sellers of products and the related issue of the liability of “sellers” of information, see Seth E.
Lipner & Lisa A. Catalano, The Tort of Giving Negligent Investment Advice, 39 U. MEM. L.
REV. 663, 669–78 (2009).
36 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 304, 310, 311 (1934).
37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965).
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the Second Restatement has called “Information Negligently Supplied for the Guid-
ance of Others”38:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or em-
ployment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuni-
ary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others
in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary
loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the infor-
mation, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in
obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Sub-
section (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for
whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information
or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends
the information to influence or knows that the recipient so in-
tends or in a substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the
information extends to loss suffered by any of the class of per-
sons for whose benefit the duty is created, in any of the transac-
tions in which it is intended to protect them.39
In Subsection (2), the Restatement outlines an intent element, limiting liability to
only those persons to whom the defendant intends to supply the information or
whom she knows will receive the information, and when the defendant intends or
knows that the information will influence the recipient through reliance upon it.40
In both sections, the authors supply the language of negligence—the failure “to
exercise reasonable care”—setting the clear standard of scienter for the tort.41
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
39 Id. (emphasis added).
40 [T]he liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered (a) by
the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recip-
ient intends to supply it; and (b) through reliance upon it in a transac-
tion that he intends the information to influence or knows that the
recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.
Id.
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 311 (1934).
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The Restatement also outlines liability for fraudulent misrepresentation, appear-
ing to be the same as for negligent misrepresentation, but fails to define the term:
One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to lia-
bility to the persons or class of persons whom he intends or has
reason to expect to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon
the misrepresentation, for pecuniary loss suffered by them through
their justifiable reliance in the type of transaction in which he
intends or has reason to expect their conduct to be influenced.42
B. State of Mind
It is therefore necessary to look to other authority in order to distinguish negli-
gent from fraudulent misrepresentation. In Section 2:15 of The Law of Fraudulent
Transactions, Peter A. Alces explains the interplay between fraud and negligence
in misrepresentations as follows:
By recognizing fraud premised on less than intentional misrepre-
sentation, the law increasingly has expanded liability. If reckless
behavior is actionable, the instances of fraud liability increase.
That enhanced exposure is further expanded when even less cul-
pable mental states, such as negligence, can trigger fraud liability.
The consequence of not recognizing negligent misrepresentation
is leaving a victim uncompensated for the loss occasioned by a
negligent party, not a particularly desirable result. When mere neg-
ligence becomes actionable, the court can engage in a familiar
analysis: Did the defendant owe the plaintiff a duty? Was that
duty breached? Did the plaintiff suffer damage? Was the breach
of duty the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury?43
In an analysis of Breeden v. Richmond Community College,44 William P. Hoye,
in Tort Litigation in Higher Education, remarks that the Middle District of North
Carolina took a similar approach to fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, dis-
tinguishing them only by the state of mind of the defendant.45 In Breeden, the plain-
tiff employee alleged that the defendant college and its employees fraudulently and
negligently concealed from him available positions for which he was qualified and
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (1977).
43 PETER A. ALCES, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS § 2:15 (2012).
44 171 F.R.D. 189 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
45 See William P. Hoye, Tort Litigation in Higher Education, 25 J.C. & U.L. 257, 281
(1998).
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could have applied and failed to inform him that his current position was contingent
upon grant funding.46 The court held that Rule 9(b) applied not only to affirmative
misrepresentations but also to fraudulent concealment, or fraud by omission.47 Then,
after recognizing federal district courts’ split on the applicability of Rule 9(b) to
negligent misrepresentation claims, the court concluded that the Rule should apply
to all claims “where the gravamen of the claim is fraud even though the theory
supporting the claim is not technically termed fraud.”48 Hoye states, “[a]ccording to
the court, fraud and negligent misrepresentation are both based upon confusion or
delusion of a party, and the only distinction between the two is the state of mind of
the defendant.”49
The District of Delaware, in applying Delaware law, a leading state in corporate
law, has also recognized that the distinction between fraud and negligent misrepresen-
tation lies in the state of mind of the defendant.50 In Snowstorm Acquisition Corp. v.
Tecumseh Products Co., the court stated that “a negligent misrepresentation claim . . .
is in essence a fraud claim with a reduced state of mind requirement.”51 In listing the
elements of negligent misrepresentation under Delaware law, including the “failure
to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or communicating information,”52 the court
uses the language of ordinary negligence to describe this reduced state of mind.53 The
District of Delaware, however, has held that Rule 9(b) should not be applied to neg-
ligent misrepresentation claims.54
46 Breeden, 171 F.R.D. at 196; Hoye, supra note 45, at 280–81.
47 Breeden, 171 F.R.D. at 195, 203 (dismissing the plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment
claims without prejudice); Hoye, supra note 45, at 281 (noting that the Breeden court found
that “the plaintiff could not meet this extremely high burden. For example, the plaintiff could
not satisfy the factor called ‘general content of the information withheld,’ because ‘[a]lthough
the general content of these omissions seems clear . . . this statement is still too general.’” (foot-
notes omitted)).
48 Breeden, 171 F.R.D. at 199 (quoting Pitten v. Jacobs, 903 F. Supp. 937, 951 (D.S.C.
1995)).
49 Hoye, supra note 45, at 281.
50 See Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 722 F. Supp. 2d 546, 561 (D. Del. 2010);
Snowstorm Acquisition Corp. v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 739 F. Supp. 2d 686, 709 (D. Del.
2010); End of the Road Trust v. Terex Corp. (In re Fruehauf Trailer Corp.), 250 B.R. 168,
197–98 (D. Del. 2000).
51 739 F. Supp. 2d at 709 (quoting Corporate Prop. Assocs. 14 Inc. v. CHR Holding
Corp., Civ. No. 3231, 2008 WL 963048 (Del. Ch. Apr. 10, 2008)).
52 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Westfield Ins. Co. v. Chip Slaughter Auto Wholesale,
Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 433, 446 (D. Del. 2010)).
53 Id.
54 See id. (quoting Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 722 F. Supp. 2d at 561); see also In re
Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 250 B.R. at 168, 197–98 (comparing precedent from other jurisdic-
tions in support of its conclusion from the District of New Jersey (In re Cendant Corp. Sec.
Litig., 190 F.R.D. 331, 337 (D.N.J. 1999)), the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Small v.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 1998 WL 848112, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 1998)), and the First
Circuit (Mass. Sch. of Law v. Am. Bar Assoc., 142 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir. 1998))).
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C. Privity
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania, subscribing to the definition of negligent
misrepresentation outlined in the Restatement,55 has also differentiated the two torts
by state of mind:
Essentially, the only distinction between the torts of fraudulent and
negligent misrepresentation is the state of mind of the purported
actor(s); the key element to both of these causes of action is that
a false representation must have been made. Stated otherwise, a
“negligent” misrepresentation is a misrepresentation which arises
from a want of “reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating information,” as opposed to a “fraudulent” mis-
representation which involves either a “knowing” or a “reckless”
communication of a misrepresentation.56
The court’s decision, however, suggests that there are additional differences be-
tween the torts of negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation. Without setting forth
the applicable Federal Rule for negligent misrepresentation pleadings, the court
determined that the plaintiff did not allege the elements of negligent misrepresen-
tation, requiring the court to grant the defendants’ motions for judgment on that por-
tion of the complaint.57 The court stated that the plaintiff bank, in pleading negligent
misrepresentation, failed to allege that the defendants owed the plaintiff bank a duty
“to provide accurate information” or that the defendants “failed to exercise reason-
able care or competence in fulfilling such a duty and in communicating th[e] . . .
information to the plaintiff.”58 The court, however, found that the plaintiff, while
alleging the same set of facts,59 adequately stated a claim upon which relief may be
55 See Constitution Bank v. DiMarco, 155 B.R. 913, 919 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
56 Id. (citations omitted).
57 Id. at 919–20.
58 Id. at 920.
59 The court described the portion of the complaint alleging fraudulent misrepresentation
as follows: “[Defendants,] in an effort to induce Constitution Bank into giving the DiMarco
Development Group a $300,000 line of credit, fraudulently misrepresented their son and
daughter-in-law’s true financial condition and did not disclose that they had received
mortgage interests in the amount of $300,000 on the junior DiMarcos’ residence.” Id. at 919.
The court described the negligent misrepresentation portion of the complaint as follows:
[Defendants] failed to disclose to Constitution Bank what they pur-
portedly knew to be the truth concerning the financial condition of their
son and daughter-in-law and DiMarco Development. Those paragraphs
further aver (1) that the defendants made these misrepresentations in
order to induce the plaintiff to extend the $300,000 line of credit to the
DiMarco Development Group and to forego execution upon the junior
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granted for fraudulent misrepresentation and satisfied the heightened pleading re-
quirements of Rule 9(b).60 The decision clearly makes an additional distinction between
fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation, in that fraudulent mis-
representation is not limited to circumstances in which the defendant owes the plain-
tiff a specific duty to provide certain information. It must be assumed that the court
read this duty requirement into the Restatement’s definition of negligent misrepre-
sentation,61 the only support the court provided in explanation of the tort.62 The court,
however, explicitly provided what a plaintiff must claim in order to state a cause of
action for fraudulent misrepresentation under state law:
(1) a misrepresentation; (2) a fraudulent utterance thereof; (3)
intention by the maker that the recipient will thereby be induced
to act; (4) justifiable reliance by the recipient upon the misrepre-
sentation; and (5) damage to the recipient as the proximate result
of the misrepresentation.63
This definition is devoid of any language that suggests any duty to the plaintiff and
requires only that the utterance or information supplied, was “fraudulent,” made with
the intention to elicit action by the recipient, justifiably relied on by the recipient,
and caused the recipient damage.64
In Negligent Misrepresentation in Texas: The Misunderstood Tort, Robert K.
Wise and Heather E. Poole have attempted to clarify the tort of negligent misrepre-
sentation in response to many courts’ conflation of negligent misrepresentation and
fraudulent misrepresentation.65 The authors note that often times a plaintiff claims
negligent misrepresentation when the defendant did not make the statement or rep-
resentation “with knowledge of its falsity or with recklessness” as to constitute fraud,
but that “the defendant at least made the statement without due care.”66 As the authors
argue, “[n]egligent misrepresentation, however, is not nearly as broad as its name
DiMarcos’s Guaranty Agreement in order to protect its loan; and (2) that
the bank suffered the loss of the $300,000 loaned as a consequence.
Id. at 920.
60 Id. at 919.
61 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); see also supra notes 38–41 and
accompanying text.
62 See Constitution Bank, 155 B.R. at 919 (articulating Pennsylvania law’s subscription
to the definition of negligent misrepresentation outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
Section 552).
63 Id. at 918.
64 Id.
65 See generally Robert K. Wise & Heather E. Poole, Negligent Misrepresentation in
Texas: The Misunderstood Tort, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 845 (2008).
66 Id. at 846.
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might imply.”67 Wise and Poole clarify that an additional element is present in
negligent misrepresentation but not fraud, which stems out of privity of contract,68
becoming a relevant factor in some cases such as Constitution Bank.69 The authors
compare the traditional standard of privity of contract, or “strict-privity,” set forth
in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,70 to the looser standards adopted by most jurisdic-
tions, which allow third parties to sue information providers under certain circum-
stances.71 The majority of courts, including the court in Constitution Bank,72 have
adopted Section 552 of the Restatement,73 which Wise and Poole explain is “an
intermediate standard—broader than the near-privity standard and narrower than the
foreseeability standard.”74 The standard is not near-privity because the information
provider does not need to know the identity of the third party who is relying on the
information.75 Under Section 552(2)(a), as long as “the information provider actually
intends” that the third party receive or knows that the third party will receive the
information and “that the provider intends to guide with the information,” the infor-
mation provider meets the standard.76 The standard is also narrower than foresee-
ability because, under Section 552(2)(b), an information provider will not be liable
for transactions that are not the same, or substantially the same, as the ones the
provider actually intends to be or knows will be influenced by the information he
provides.77 The authors argue that these privity-like standards, creating a narrower
scope of liability for negligent misrepresentation than for fraud, are a result of the
difference between the obligations of honesty and of care.78 Honesty, requiring only
that “the maker of a representation speak in good faith and without consciousness
67 Id.
68 See id. at 847–49, 914–15.
69 155 B.R. at 919.
70 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). The plaintiff, in extending credit to a corporation, relied on
an erroneous balance sheet that the defendant accountant audited for the corporation and
sought damages for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. at 443. The court, in an
opinion by Chief Judge Cardozo, held that the accountant did not owe a duty of care to the
creditor, protecting accountants from “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeter-
minate time to an indeterminate class.” Id. at 444.
71 See Wise & Poole, supra note 65, at 848 (“Three different standards have evolved to
replace the strict-privity standard and to delineate which third parties have standing to sue an
information provider for negligent misrepresentation: (1) the near-privity standard, (2) the fore-
seeability standard, and (3) the standard set forth in section 552 of the Second Restatement.”).
72 155 B.R. 919 (“Pennsylvania subscribes to the definition of negligent misrepresenta-
tion outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts . . . .”).
73 Wise & Poole, supra note 65, at 851; see also Lipner & Catalano, supra note 35, at
678–81.
74 Wise & Poole, supra note 65, at 852.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a) (1977).
78 Wise & Poole, supra note 65, at 852–53.
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of a lack of any basis for belief in the truth or accuracy of what he says,”79 can be
reasonably expected of a supplier of information by any user of the information if
his use is reasonably foreseeable, allowing for the broad action of fraud.80 Duty of
care, however, which implies an “undertaking to observe a relative standard,”81 would
require an information provider to weigh the risks involved in a specific transaction
should the information provided be incorrect. This obligation can only be expected
of someone who “was manifestly aware of the use to which the information was
to be put and intended to supply it for that purpose.”82 Similarly, in International
Products Co. v. Erie Railroad Co.,83 a monumental decision in the development of
common-law negligent misrepresentation from the New York Court of Appeals, a
state which has not adopted Restatement Section 522, Judge Andrews noted that the
duty inquiry must look to the “peculiar facts presented,” including “the relationship
of the parties, arising out of contract or otherwise, must be such that in morals and
good conscience the one has the right to rely upon the other for information, and the
other giving the information owes a duty to give it with care.”84 More recent cases
from New York have set forth a clearer, possibly more limited standard of privity,
including when there is actual privity of contract, the existence of fiduciary obliga-
tions, or “a special relationship of trust or confidence between the parties.”85 A duty
of care may also arise when the relationship between the parties is “so close as to
approach that of privity.”86
79 Id. at 853.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 155 N.E. 662 (N.Y. 1927).
84 Id. at 664. Judge Andrews held that the defendant, who falsely told the plaintiff that
the plaintiff’s goods had already arrived in the plaintiff’s warehouse, causing the plaintiff to
procure insurance only for the goods that he believed were still in transit and, consequently,
to suffer loss when the uninsured goods were destroyed by fire, was not liable because the
defendant did not owe plaintiff a duty to give correct information. Id.; Lipner & Catalano,
supra note 35, at 672–74; see also White v. Guarente, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319 (N.Y. 1977) (“As
to duty imposed, generally a negligent statement may be the basis for recovery of damages,
where there is carelessness in imparting words upon which others were expected to rely and
upon which they did act or failed to act to their damage, but such information is not action-
able unless expressed directly, with knowledge or notice that it will be acted upon, to one to
whom the author is bound by some relation of duty, arising out of contract or otherwise, to
act with care if he acts at all.” (footnotes omitted)).
85 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 584 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Banque Arabe et Internationale D’Investissement v. Md. Nat’l Bank, 57 F.3d 146, 158 (2d
Cir. 1995)).
86 Id. (“A relationship is considered ‘so close as to approach that of privity when the
following criteria are met: 1) the defendant makes a statement with the awareness that the
statement was to be used for a particular purpose; 2) a known party or parties rely on this
statement in furtherance of that purpose; and 3) there is some conduct by the defendant
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The court in Constitution Bank, however, when applying the concept of duty,
was speaking of the defendants’ duty to the bank.87 The bank was not a third party
to this information supplier, but it seemed that the defendants, who received credit
from the bank and arguably had at least near-privity, if not strict-privity (privity of
contract), with the bank, possessed a very specific duty in regards to the credit trans-
action.88 It is, therefore, possible that the court’s decision hinged more precisely on
the issue of who may be a proper defendant of a negligent misrepresentation claim,
found in Section 552(1) of the Restatement.89 This Section, limiting liability to
“[o]ne who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest,”90 does not only apply to defendants
who are in the business of supplying information for others’ guidance, as plaintiffs
may incorrectly argue, but applies to a professional or anyone else so long as they
have a “pecuniary interest” in the transaction.91 In other words, a defendant may be a
professional who is paid for his information—for example, providing services—but
he may also be a person who is paid “in the course of and as part of [the transaction
in] which [the information] is supplied.”92 Typically, the defendant of a negligent
misrepresentation claim is a professional seeking to profit in a business or commer-
cial transaction.93 Constitution Bank may be read as holding that the receivers of the
loan did not qualify as proper defendants, as the bank, not the creditees, possessed
the stronger pecuniary interest in the transaction.94
linking it to the party or parties and evincing defendant’s understanding of their reliance.”
(citation omitted)).
87 Constitution Bank v. DiMarco, 155 B.R. 913, 920–21 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
88 See id.
89 See Lipner & Catalano, supra note 35, at 708 (examining J.A.O. Acquisition Corp. v.
Stavitsky, 863 N.E.2d 585 (N.Y. 2007) (affirming the lower court’s holding that the plaintiff
buyer in a stock purchase transaction, who relied on an incorrect “pay-off letter” from the
seller company’s bank, did not demonstrate that a special relationship or that privity existed
and that reliance had not been demonstrated, entitling the bank to summary judgment)). The
authors stated:
J.A.O. Acquisition [is not] about privity. [It is] about determining
whether the defendant fits the mold of the . . . warehouseman in Inter-
national Products—that is, whether this defendant is within the class
of enterprises that can be a potential defendant in a negligent misrepre-
sentation case. Privity cases are about whether the plaintiff is in the
class of plaintiffs who may sue.
Id. (citing Int’l Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R. Co., 155 N.E. 662, 664 (N.Y. 1927)).
90 Wise & Poole, supra note 65, at 861 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 552(1) (1977)).
91 Lipner & Catalano, supra note 35, at 682–84.
92 Wise & Poole, supra note 65, at 864 (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(a) cmt. d. (1977)).
93 See id.
94 See Constitution Bank v. DiMarco, 155 B.R. 913, 920–21 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Wise &
Poole, supra note 65, at 864.
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D. But-for Reliance and Economic Loss
Negligent misrepresentation also includes the element of “but-for” reliance,
requiring the court to find that, but for the misrepresentation by the defendant, the
plaintiff would not have gone through with the transaction.95 The impact of this
element can also be seen in the more limited damages recovery available to plaintiffs
in negligent misrepresentation actions than to plaintiffs in fraud actions.96 It is also
clear that victims of negligent misrepresentation must have suffered some kind of
economic loss in order to recover under the tort.97
III. CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT ON THE APPLICABILITY OF RULE 9(B) TO
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
The federal circuit courts of appeals are currently split on the issue of whether
FRCP Rule 9(b) should apply to negligent misrepresentation claims, and judicial
opinions, from both state and federal courts, differ in their classification of negligent
misrepresentation as a “fraud-based” claim.98 Federal courts, in applying state law,
have characterized the tort of negligent misrepresentation in divergent ways. In
Baltimore County v. Cigna Healthcare,99 the Fourth Circuit concluded that “a claim
of negligent misrepresentation under Maryland law does not contain an essential
showing of fraud and thus heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) do not
95 See, e.g., Lipner & Catalano, supra note 35, at 708 (“The J.A.O. Acquisition court,
however, rested its decision exclusively on a determination that there was no reliance, find-
ing that the buyer would have gone through with the transaction anyway. . . . The case serves
as an important reminder that the tort of negligent misrepresentation includes the element of
‘but-for’ reliance.”).
96 See Wise & Poole, supra note 65, at 914 (“[Negligent misrepresentation] is limited to
misrepresentations of past or existing facts made in connection with a business or commer-
cial transaction and provides a more limited exception to the economic-loss rule, permitting
the recovery of only out-of-pocket losses and reliance damages rather than the benefit of the
plaintiff’s bargain.”).
97 See R. Joseph Barton, Note, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the Eco-
nomic Loss Rule to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1789, 1822 (2000) (“The final approach to resolving the tension between the economic
loss rule and negligent misrepresentation concludes that ‘negligent misrepresentation is a
species of negligence.’ Accordingly, no exception applies to negligent misrepresentation.”
(citations omitted)).
98 See Barney J. Finberg, Construction and Application of Provision of Rule 9(b), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, that Circumstances Constituting Fraud or Mistake Be Stated with
Particularity, 27 A.L.R. FED. 407 (1976); A. Benjamin Spencer, D. Colo. Notes Split Re
Whether FRCP 9(b) Applies to Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, SPLIT CIRCUITS (Mar. 13,
2012, 5:18 AM), http://splitcircuits.blogspot.com/2012/03/d-colo-notes-split-re-whether-frcp
-9b.html.
99 238 F. App’x 914 (4th Cir. 2007).
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apply” even when they appear alongside fraud allegations.100 Similarly, in Triconti-
nental Industries, Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP,101 the Seventh Circuit held
that heightened pleading requirements do not apply to negligent misrepresentation
claims.102 Nonetheless, the court found that the plaintiff, Tricontinental, failed to
satisfy the ordinary pleading standard of Rule 8, requiring the plaintiff to set forth
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [it] is entitled to relief.”103 The
court stated the following:
Tricontinental alleges that PwC knew of its reliance on the 1997
audit opinion, knew of the misrepresentation contained in the
statement and “allowed plaintiffs to rely on the false and mis-
leading information.” . . . [A]lthough we agree with Tricon-
tinental that neither privity nor independent verification need
to be asserted or shown in order to state a claim, Tricontinental
must set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that [it] is entitled to relief.” Absent an allegation that fairly states
that Anicom’s primary intent in retaining and utilizing PwC’s
services and work product during the transaction was to influ-
ence Tricontinental, or absent factual allegations that support
such an inference, Tricontinental has not stated a claim for neg-
ligent misrepresentation under Illinois law.104
In requiring “intent to influence” to be alleged in the complaint in order to satisfy
notice pleading, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the complaint—not because height-
ened pleading was required for negligent misrepresentation—but because the plain-
tiff would not have been entitled to relief without alleging the essential elements of
the tort.105
The Eighth Circuit has adopted the opposite conclusion, applying Rule 9(b) to
negligent misrepresentation claims.106 A strong dissent by Chief Judge Riley in
Trooien v. Mansour accompanied this ruling, arguing that the trial court “wrongly
conflated” the plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim with his fraudulent
misrepresentation claim.107 The Chief Judge stated, “[i]t appears the district court
100 Id. at 921 (“In evaluating whether a cause of action must be pled with particularity, a
court should examine whether the claim requires an essential showing of fraud.” (citing Vess v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1104–05 (9th Cir. 2003))).
101 475 F.3d 824, 838 (7th Cir. 2007).
102 Id. at 838–39.
103 Id. at 839 (alteration in original).
104 Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
105 Id.
106 See, e.g, Trooien v. Mansour, 608 F.3d 1020, 1028 (8th Cir. 2010).
107 Id. at 1033 (Riley, C.J., dissenting).
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impermissibly subjected Trooien’s negligent misrepresentation claim to the more
exacting scrutiny it applied to his fraudulent misrepresentation claim. . . . The
district court might have reached a different conclusion had it applied the Minnesota
law of negligent misrepresentation independently and completely.”108
The Second Circuit, in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., has
also applied Rule 9(b) to negligent misrepresentation claims.109 After defining the
tort of negligent misrepresentation under New York law,110 the court dismissed the
claim under Rule 9(b), holding that the plaintiff “failed to allege with specificity any
representation made to it by the instant movants [for dismissal] to induce its entry
into the . . . Agreement,” and, therefore, did not demonstrate that the negligent mis-
representation was made “for the very purpose of inducing action.”111 Without un-
dertaking an independent analysis of whether Rule 9(b) should apply to negligent
misrepresentation claims, the court cited precedent including Pitten v. Jacobs,112 a
district court opinion from the District of South Carolina which stated the following:
“Although the language of Rule 9(b) confines its requirements to claims of mistake
and fraud, the requirements of the rule apply to all cases where the gravamen of
the claim is fraud even though the theory supporting the claim is not technically
termed fraud.”113
The Second Circuit’s application of Rule 9(b) to negligent misrepresentation
claims is also odd considering that the circuit applies Rule 8(a) to claims under the
Securities Act, which contains the same elements as negligent misrepresentation
under New York law.114
Denver Health & Hospital Authority v. Beverage Distributors Co.,115 a 2012
district court opinion from the District of Colorado, differed from the District of
South Carolina’s characterization of negligent misrepresentation as a fraud-based
claim, and rejected the application of Rule 9(b) to these claims.116 The court reasoned:
108 Id. (citation omitted).
109 404 F.3d 566 (2d Cir. 2005).
110 Id. at 583 (“[W]here the defendant has been careless ‘in imparting words upon which
others were expected to rely and upon which they did or failed to act to their damage,’ and
where the author of the statement has ‘some relationship or duty . . . to act with care’ vis-a-
vis the party at whom the statement is directed.” (citations omitted)).
111 Id. at 583–84.
112 903 F. Supp. 937 (D.S.C. 1995).
113 Id. at 951 (quoting Toner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 821 F. Supp. 276, 283 (D. Del. 1993)).
114 See Kimball Dean Parker, Comment, A Historical Approach to Negligent Misrepresen-
tation and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2013).
115 843 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (D. Colo. 2012).
116 Id. at 1178–79 (holding that, under Colorado law, the plaintiff, although not providing
any “factual allegations [in the complaint] regarding exactly what was said by whoever said it,”
provided enough factual allegations to “support the reasonable inference that [the defendant] it-
self represented that [the plaintiff] was covered” under its insurance plan as to “elevate the claim
‘above the speculative level’” (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007))).
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“The crux of the claim is that [the defendant] failed to use reasonable care or com-
petence in obtaining and communicating information concerning [the plaintiff’s]
eligibility. This rings not of fraud but negligence.”117
Other opinions from this district, however, have held the reverse, applying the
heightened pleading of Rule 9(b) to negligent misrepresentation claims and demon-
strating a lack of uniformity within districts themselves.118
Without clear authority on the topic, potential plaintiffs are left without guidance
on how to adequately plead their claims. The circuit split on which Rule applies
encourages forum shopping, and plaintiffs will seek to file their claims in a federal
court which applies Rule 8(a).119 In 2010, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Eames v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,120 letting stand the Third Circuit’s
decision not to disturb the district court’s ruling that Rule 9(b) heightened pleading
applied to the plaintiffs’ claims under the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act, which can
be violated by common-law negligent misrepresentation.121 The district court held
that, although negligent misrepresentation is sufficient to violate the statute, the
plaintiffs’ complaint “appear[ed] to allege false representations by [the insurer] that
were known to be false,” and, therefore, the alleged fraud had to be pled with par-
ticularity.122 Having received a petition for certiorari in the recent past involving the
scope of Rule 9(b), it is likely that the Supreme Court will be confronted with this
issue again. Should the Supreme Court be faced with a clear case of dismissal of a
petitioner’s common-law negligent misrepresentation claim due to his failure to sat-
isfy heightened pleading, the Court should grant certiorari and resolve the circuit court
split by restoring Rule 8(a) notice pleading for all claims that are not based in fraud.
The remainder of this Note argues that an analysis of the issue in the context of
the goals and design of the Federal Rules and in the context of plaintiffs’ rights of
procedural due process would support a conclusion limiting the application of the
Rule to the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation.
117 Id. at 1177.
118 Compare Conrad v. Educ. Res. Inst., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1183 (D. Colo. 2009)
(“The theory of liability for negligent misrepresentation is one of negligence, rather than of
intent to mislead. Thus, a claim for negligent misrepresentation should not be governed by the
pleading standard set forth in Rule 9(b).” (citations omitted)), with Gunningham v. Standard
Fire Ins. Co., No. 07-cv-02538, 2008 WL 4377451, at *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 19, 2008) (holding
that, because the plaintiff failed to allege “how this information was communicated to the
plaintiff, where the plaintiff was located when such communications were received, or the
identity of any representative of the defendants who communicated this information on behalf
of the defendants,” the plaintiff’s general pleading of negligent misrepresentation did not
satisfy Rule 9(b)).
119 See Parker, supra note 114, at 1463.
120 346 F. App’x 859 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1006 (2010).
121 Id. at 860–61.
122 Eames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 431, 437 (D. Del. 2006).
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IV. TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR HEIGHTENED PLEADING
Circuit courts have proposed several justifications for heightened pleading
required by FRCP Rule 9(b) for fraud claims, emphasizing a necessity to protect
defendants from harmful allegations.123
Rule 9(b) requires that a plaintiff plead fraud with particularity,
so that the pleading “provides defendants with fair notice of the
plaintiffs’ claims, protects defendants from harm to their reputa-
tion and goodwill, reduces the number of strike suits, and pre-
vents plaintiffs from filing baseless claims and then attempting
to discover unknown wrongs.”124
However, it is the goal of the court system for cases to be assessed on their
merits and not lost on procedural technicalities.125 Given the recognized liberal
thrust of Rule 8 notice pleading and of the Federal Rules in general126—favoring the
survival of claims—it is important to consider whether Rule 9 as currently applied
by federal circuit courts reflects the goals of the Federal Rules and of our court sys-
tem. The broad consensus regarding heightened pleading,127 mainly that, in instances
of fraud, defendants should be afforded greater knowledge of—and, in the subse-
quent event of dismissal, protection against—the allegations against them, implies
123 See, e.g., supra note 118.
124 Zuckerman v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 618, 622–23 (N.D. Tex. 1998)
(quoting Tuchman v. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994)) (determin-
ing that, because a plaintiff can plead the scienter element of fraud by “alleging either motive
and opportunity to commit fraud, or by pleading facts which identify circumstances indicat-
ing [d]efendants’ conscious or reckless behavior, so long as the totality of the allegations
raises a strong inference of fraudulent intent,” the plaintiff met the heightened pleading
requirements of FRCP 9(b)).
125 See 61A AM. JUR. 2D Pleading § 104 (2010) (“Underlying the construction of any
pleading in a federal district court is the principle that pleadings must be construed so as to
do justice. To this end, a complaint is to be liberally construed in favor of the pleader, with the
benefit of all proper inferences being given to him or her. This principle of liberal construc-
tion of pleadings embodies the fundamental design of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to preserve the substance of an action from failing because of technical irregularities in form.”
(footnotes omitted)).
126 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, at § 1202 (“[P]leadings are to be construed liberally
so as to do substantial justice . . . . As a practical matter . . . provisions in Rule 8 have ramifi-
cations that transcend the pleading stage of federal practice. To some degree, the functioning
of all the procedures in the federal rules for broad joinder of parties and claims, discovery,
liberal amendment, judicial management, and summary judgment are intertwined inextri-
cably with the pleading philosophy embodied in Rule 8.”).
127 See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 563–65
(2002) (explaining the broad consensus behind the reasons for heightened pleading).
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that the defendants’ interests in these cases outweigh the traditional aims of the
Federal Rules.128 It is imperative to consider whether, with the extension of the ap-
plication of heightened pleading requirements to the tort of negligent misrepresen-
tation, these justifications still stand as to outweigh the intent of the Federal Rules
and, arguably, plaintiffs’ rights to procedural due process.
A. Injury to Defendant’s Reputation
A primary rationale for affording the protection of heightened pleading lies in
the belief that fraud is a serious allegation and could cause enormous injury to a
defendant’s reputation.129 Assuming that this is the real rationale behind Rule 9(b),
Fairman argues that the Rule’s application solely to claims of “fraud or mistake”
would be enormously underinclusive.130 The risk of reputational harm is not unique
to defendants of fraud, but is present for defendants of virtually all intentional tort
claims, including assault and battery, and even claims which may be unintentional,
such as professional malpractice and wrongful death.131 However, heightened plead-
ing is not required for any other tort.132 What Fairman fails to acknowledge is that,
practically, common defendants of allegations of fraud are corporations, or individuals
which represent a corporation and are integral to the corporation’s reputation,133 a
quality that most torts, such as assault and battery, do not possess. In this sense, fraud
is unique in its potential for enormous reputational damage due to the larger, public
audience that corporations receive. For corporations, reputational harm has a greater
likelihood of translating into material harm and can be demonstrated tangibly through
the success or failure of the business in the aftermath of a fraud claim.134
128 See id. at 618.
129 See Christopher M. Fairman, An Invitation to the Rulemakers—Strike Rule 9(b), 38
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 291–92 (2004) (“The court clearly states the rationale: ‘Rule 9(b)’s
specificity requirement stems . . . from the desire to protect defendants from the harm that
comes to their reputations or to their goodwill when they are charged with serious wrong-
doing.’ The only explanation offered, however, is that it is a ‘serious matter to charge a
person with fraud.’” (citing Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir. 1972))); Richard L.
Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 448 (1986) (“It is a serious matter to charge a person with fraud and
hence no one is permitted to do so unless he is in a position and is willing to put himself on
record as to what the alleged fraud consists of specifically.” (citing Segal, 467 F.2d at 607)).
130 Fairman, supra note 129, at 292.
131 Id.
132 See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); Fairman, supra note 129, at 292.
133 See, e.g., Finberg, supra note 98 (listing relevant federal court decisions regarding the
application of Rule 9(b) to claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation).
134 Reputation Changer: Scam Accusations, Fraud Complaints Can Destroy Businesses
and Brands, MARKETWIRE (Jan. 7, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.marketwired.com/press
-release/reputation-changer-scam-accusations-fraud-complaints-can-destroy-businesses
-brands-1742803.htm.
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Assuming that this rationale may be valid for fraud claims, the rationale seems
inapplicable to negligent misrepresentation, which, as an unintentional tort, is distin-
guishable from fraud and is viewed in the public opinion as less culpable.135 Consider
the following argument from Francis Bohlen, in Should Negligent Misrepresentations
Be Treated as Negligence or Fraud:
[I]t is apt to lead to false analogies to speak of negligent conduct
which leads to unintended misinformation as fraud, which, both
in the law and in public opinion, implies a conscious purpose to
mislead. In all other fields of tort law the line is sharply drawn
between intentional and unintentional injury. The persistence of
this distinction can only be explained by recognizing the fact that
it is in accord with the normal reactions of the mass of mankind.
If negligent misrepresentation is called fraud, and, therefore,
comes to be regarded by courts as tantamount thereto, there is
anger that the unintentional character of the one and the inten-
tional character of the other will be overlooked. There is danger
that that liability, which is regarded both by lawyers and laymen
as just where there is conscious dishonesty, will be imposed al-
though there is no purpose to deceive.136
In this sense, not only is the justification of protecting defendants from repu-
tational harm weak in cases of negligent misrepresentations, in which a defendant’s
actions are viewed as less culpable, but classifying negligent misrepresentation as
a fraud-based claim as to require the heightened pleading of Rule 9(b) may actually
pose a greater risk of reputational harm to defendants.137 To recognize claims of neg-
ligent misrepresentations as “serious” allegations that require heightened pleading
would be to blur the distinction between the unintentional and intentional character
of these torts.138 As Bohlen warned in 1932, “[c]all any two essentially different things
by the same name and the two are likely to be treated as identical for all purposes.”139
Fairman argues that the rationale that heightened pleading protects defendants
from the risk of reputational harm is indefensible considering the practical impact
of the Rule; procedurally, the Rule is invoked after a claim has been filed, through
a defendant’s motion to dismiss.140 Fairman argues that, presumably, “[o]nce the
135 See Francis H. Bohlen, Should Negligent Misrepresentations Be Treated as Negligence
or Fraud?, 18 VA. L. REV. 703, 706–07 (1932); Fairman, supra note 129, at 292.
136 Bohlen, supra note 135, at 706–07.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 Id. at 707.
140 Fairman, supra note 129, at 293; see FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
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fraud claim is filed, the reputational damage is largely done.”141 It is almost certain
that defendants, especially corporate defendants, would disagree, and the reputational
risks the corporation would face if the claim survives the pleading stages and the
issue is subject to discovery would be much greater than if the baseless claim had
been dismissed.142 Firstly, during discovery, the corporation is vulnerable to expo-
sure as it is required to supply information to the courts, and subsequently, the
media.143 Additionally, if a claim survives, it is generally assumed to have some
merit and would be taken more seriously by the public.144 The additional time and
resources expended in defending against the claim would alone draw additional
attention to the lawsuit.145 These basic, practical consequences of a lawsuit, which
Fairman ignores, provide an explanation for why corporate defendants settle early
in the vast majority of cases, despite the fact that they may be unlikely to lose
against these weak claims in court.146
B. Deterrence for Plaintiffs in Filing Baseless Claims
The procedural placement of the Rule does, however, negate the traditional
justification that heightened pleading would deter plaintiffs from filing baseless
claims.147 Common sense reveals that if a plaintiff is so audacious as to file a frivo-
lous lawsuit, heightened pleading requirements would not be an obstacle that would
deter him from bringing suit.148 Because judges often allow leave to amend, a plain-
tiff would then be afforded more time to “discover unknown wrongs,”149 accompa-
nied with the expenditure of more judicial resources in assessing the sufficiency of
the complaint.150
141 Fairman, supra note 129, at 293.
142 See, e.g., infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text; see also Jeannette Neumann,
Evan Perez & Jean Eaglesham, U.S., S&P Settle in for Bitter Combat, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6,
2013, at A1, A2.
143 See, e.g., Neumann, Perez & Eaglesham, supra note 142; see also To Settle or Not to
Settle? That is the Question, LAWYERS.COM (2013), http://research.lawyers.com/To-Settle-or
-Not-to-settle-that-is-the-question.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (discussing the privacy
benefits involved in settling a case).
144 See, e.g., Neumann, Perez & Eaglesham, supra note 142.
145 See, e.g., id.
146 See Jonathan D. Glater, The Cost of Not Settling a Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008,
at C1 (summarizing a study on the benefits of settling lawsuits); To Settle or Not to Settle?
That is the Question, supra note 143.
147 Fairman, supra note 129, at 294–96.
148 Id. at 295.
149 Zuckerman v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 618, 622 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (quoting
Tuchman v. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994)).
150 Fairman, supra note 129, at 295.
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C. Fair Notice for Defendants
Finally, Fairman argues that the rationale that heightened pleading is necessary
to provide defendants of fraud claims with fair notice of a plaintiff’s claims fails be-
cause ordinary Rule 8 notice pleading is sufficient.151 Fairman asserts that, because
Rule 8 guarantees notice and a “showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”152
Rule 9(b) is unnecessary.153 Although defendants of fraud claims may require more
information in order to understand the basis of the claim due to the nature of the tort,
or “fraud’s intrinsic amorphousness,”154 the remedies of filing a motion for a more
definite statement155 or a motion for dismissal for failure to state a claim156 are ade-
quate alternatives.157 In other words, the requirements of Rule 9(b)—that the cir-
cumstances surrounding the claim including the who, what, where, when, and how,
be plead with particularity—are unnecessary, because if the essential elements of the
tort are not alleged, the plaintiff could not show that he is entitled to relief, and his
complaint will be dismissed anyway.158 The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Tricon-
tinental Industries, Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, is an example of how
courts, using ordinary notice pleading, have dismissed claims which may, in some
jurisdictions, require the application of Rule 9(b).159 However, adopting Rule 8 no-
tice pleading might invite courts to assume a more lackadaisical approach, resulting
in the survival of baseless claims which, under proper scrutiny, would not demon-
strate all the essential elements of the alleged tort.160 Those elements which may
intrinsically require more detailed pleading, such as intent, may be overlooked.161
In this event, Fairman provides an unjustifiable alternative. He states, if the remedies
that would result in dismissal are not available, “details can be developed through
the regular course of discovery.”162 This argument completely ignores that the pre-
vention of baseless claims from reaching discovery is the central goal pervasive in
all the justifications reviewed thus far. This Note will later address how, although
Rule 9(b) may be justifiable for fraud-based claims in order to provide defendants
with adequate notice, the justification may not be present for the fundamentally
different tort of negligent misrepresentation or is outweighed by plaintiff’s right of
due process.
151 Id. at 296–97.
152 FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
153 Fairman, supra note 129, at 286.
154 Id. at 296.
155 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(e).
156 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
157 Fairman, supra note 129, at 296–97.
158 See supra Parts I.A–B.
159 475 F.3d 824, 838–39 (7th Cir. 2007).
160 See supra Part I.B.
161 See supra Part I.B.
162 Fairman, supra note 129, at 297.
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It would be a momentous and unjustifiable step for legislatures to strike Rule 9(b)
altogether. The justifications for heightened pleading for fraud-based claims have been
historically accepted and judicially enforced, and, after having scrutinized these jus-
tifications, they cannot all be determined to be without merit.163 For these reasons, it
is also unlikely that the Supreme Court would refuse to apply Rule 9(b) to fraud claims.
V. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution provide that no
citizen of the United States will be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.”164 Due process violations related to the pleading stage of a law-
suit are typically viewed in the context of a defendant’s rights and the common justi-
fications of “notice” pleading.165 “Due process requires that a complaint be definite
and certain so as to reasonably apprise the defendant of the nature of a charge against
him or her, so that he or she may be prepared properly to meet such charges.”166
Instead of limiting a due process inquiry to defendants’ rights, a standard ap-
plicable to both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ rights would allow for a finding of denial
of due process as a result of a court ruling in connection to a pleading
where they adversely affect a party’s material and substantial
rights, such as to file a responsive pleading, but will not be deemed
to deny due process if there is no material or substantial injury to
the party concerned, as where the ruling, even if erroneous, is
merely incidental and subject to correction.
In the absence of harm to an opposing party, there is no de-
nial of due process in extending the time to answer without notice
to the opposing party.167
This standard is more neutral, providing both examples in the context of defen-
dants’ rights—their ability “to file a responsive pleading”—and a consideration of
163 See supra notes 124–56 and accompanying text.
164 All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
165 See 17 OHIO JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 523 (2013). Ohio’s civil procedure laws are
patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and can be used in support of a federal-
level constitutional analysis.
166 Id.
167 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1769 (2013) (footnotes omitted).
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harm to plaintiffs—as a result of “extending [a defendant’s] time to answer.”168
Considering the substantial injury to either party in a lawsuit is in accord with due
process generally, as due process “protects persons against deprivations of life,
liberty, or property, and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must
establish that one of those interests is at stake.”169 A plaintiff’s cause of action, as
a constitutionally protected property right, cannot be dismissed without adequate
procedural consideration.170
It is clear that “[t]he dismissal of an insufficient or defective pleading does not
deny a plaintiff’s right to due process of law.”171 However, dismissing claims that
may have merit but cannot satisfy the stringent requirements of heightened pleading
would be to deny a recourse for which the substantive law may allow.
Some student authors have considered the result of pleading requirements on
plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights in the context of pro se litigants.172 Their
argument is that pro se litigants, who lack the financial means to hire legal represen-
tation and the expertise to file an effective pleading themselves, and often are
“frequently denied the right to proceed through our court system”173 and are left
“without an avenue to rightfully address their grievances”174 because they cannot
satisfy the requirements of ordinary notice pleading. Consider the following:
In light of the recent decision announced by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the pleading standard es-
tablished under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires
that, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” With respect to pro se plaintiffs, Federal
168 Id.
169 OHIO JUR. 3D, supra note 165, at § 523.
170 See R. D. Rees, Note, Plaintiff Due Process Rights in Assertions of Personal Jurisdiction,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 406–14 (2003) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
428 (1982)).
171 11A ILL. LAW & PRAC. Constitutional Law § 412 (2013); see, e.g., Deasey v. City of
Chicago, 105 N.E.2d 727, 729 (Ill. 1952).
172 See Candice K. Lee, Note, Access Denied: Limitations on Pro Se Litigants’ Access to
the Courts in the Eighth Circuit, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1261, 1280 (2003) (“Pro se litigants,
however, like all citizens, have the constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts.
Accordingly, the courts should ensure that this right of access is a realistic goal for pro se
litigants to reach.” (footnotes omitted)); Melodee C. Rhodes, Comment, The Battle Lines of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and the Effects on a Pro Se Litigant’s Ability to
Survive a Motion to Dismiss, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 527, 530 (2010) (proposing that “the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be modified to include guidance for pro se plaintiffs filing
a civil complaint or a prohibition against pro se plaintiffs filing their own complaint”).
173 Rhodes, supra note 172, at 529.
174 Id. at 539.
1246 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 22:1221
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) is unconstitutional because it
violates an individual’s procedural due process rights by requiring
a pleading standard that a layperson finds difficult to satisfy. . . .
Nevertheless, pro se plaintiffs who do not possess the requisite
skill, knowledge, or experience to effectively comply with the re-
quirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), are allowed
to draft and file their own complaints in civil action cases.175
The argument presented in this Note is analogous to the deprivation of pro se
litigants’ right to due process. Just as pro se litigants lack the information and ex-
pertise necessary to pass muster under the standard of Rule 8, resulting in the pre-
mature dismissal of their claims,176 plaintiffs asserting negligent misrepresentation
claims may not have the tools necessary to satisfy heightened pleading.177 The lack
of uniformity in courts in applying a pleading standard, as demonstrated by the cur-
rent federal circuit court split,178 prevents plaintiffs from receiving adequate notice
of what is sufficient to avoid dismissal.179 Courts’ conflation of the elements of neg-
ligent misrepresentation with fraud also contributes to the dismissal of claims that
might otherwise have merit.180 Finally, the inconspicuous elements of negligent mis-
representation, when paired with the requirements of heightened pleading, present
an undue burden on plaintiffs who, at the outset of a claim, are unable to utilize the
tools of discovery.181 This Note argues that the result of plaintiffs’ inability to obtain
the information necessary to satisfy the stringent requirements of Rule 9(b), the
dismissal of the claim, is a material injury constituting a deprivation of plaintiffs’
right to procedural due process.
VI. DIFFICULTIES OF PLEADING NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION PRE-DISCOVERY
The difficulty in submitting a well-pleaded complaint—stating “with particular-
ity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake,”182 including the time, place,
contents of the fraud, identity of the fraudulent persons, and the consequences of the
175 Id. at 529 (footnotes omitted).
176 Id. at 529–30.
177 See infra Part VI.
178 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
179 See infra Part VII.
180 See, e.g., Trooien v. Mansour, 608 F.3d 1020, 1028 (8th Cir. 2010).
181 The scienter requirement for fraud is substituted with the negligence standard in neg-
ligent misrepresentation. See Marcus, supra note 129, at 436–37, 468 (arguing that, instead
of the requirement of heightened pleading, the preferable route for probing plaintiff’s factual
conclusions should be to rely on more flexible use of summary judgment); supra Part II.B.
182 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
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fraud—arises when the necessary information cannot be obtained before reaching
the discovery process.183 The specific instances constituting the tort of negligent
misrepresentation may not be as conspicuous as fraud, making the pinning down of
the time, place, and parties involved especially difficult, but such information may
be just as buried within the records of the defendant.184 Difficulties are even greater
when courts improperly require some form of heightened pleading for the elements of
negligent misrepresentation, including state of mind, privity, and but-for reliance.185
In contemplating the necessity of information, which may only be available in
discovery, to the survival of negligent misrepresentation claims, it may be useful to
examine the specific information lacking in a complaint that has led to dismissal. In
its dismissal of the plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claims under the height-
ened pleading standard of Rule 9(b), the court in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Aniero Concrete Co. has provided a good example of difficult-to-obtain information
that courts may require of claimants of this tort:
If Aniero is able to cite specific representations made by Aetna
or Hudson for the purpose of inducing it to enter the contract,
the elements needed to establish a relationship of near-privity
may be met. Because I do not believe the filing of an amended
complaint would be futile as to this claim, I grant the plaintiff
leave to amend so as to set forth the representations at issue with
greater particularity.186
It is easy to imagine the difficulty posed to the plaintiff by the Second Circuit’s
dictate in amending their complaints. In order to establish the privity requirement
and satisfy this element of negligent misrepresentation in pleading, an element not
present for fraud claims, must Aniero claim that specific representations were made
by the defendant for the purpose of inducing them to act? How can Aniero effectively
183 See Marcus, supra note 129, at 468 (“Where the court requires detailed support for a
legal conclusion, analysis of the details may permit the court to conclude confidently that the
plaintiff has no case. But where the plaintiff is unable to provide details because only the de-
fendant possesses such information, no such confidence is possible. To the contrary, it may
be that the defendant has so effectively concealed his wrongdoing that the plaintiff can un-
earth it only with discovery. To insist on details as a prerequisite to discovery is putting the
cart before the horse.” (footnotes omitted)).
184 See id.
185 See id. at 469 (“[I]nsistence on detailed evidence regarding state of mind violates the
second sentence of Rule 9(b), which specifies that ‘[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other
condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.’ On its face, this sentence precludes
use of the Rule to require plaintiffs to provide particulars on the very matters for which so
many courts say that supporting facts are now required.” (footnotes omitted)).
186 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 584 (2d Cir. 2005). The
court granted leave to amend pursuant to FRCP Rule 15(a).
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allege the state of mind of another party—a corporate defendant—in such a circum-
stance? Seemingly contrary to the court’s mandate in this decision, Rule 9(b) pro-
vides that the state of mind of the defendant may be alleged generally.187 Nevertheless,
the court’s unreasonable requirement in this instance demonstrates the unique dif-
ficulties for claimants of negligent misrepresentation when faced with the standard
of Rule 9(b) heightened pleading.
Some proponents argue that heightened pleading is more favorable than notice
pleading for all claims, as it is more conducive to dismissal.188 There are obvious
reasons why claims that do not sufficiently meet pleading standards should be dis-
missed. The fear that defendants would be forced to settle unmeritorious claims to
prevent the depletion of their resources during discovery is supreme among these
reasons.189 Discovery tactics, such as seemingly endless information requests, em-
ployed to drain the other parties’ time and finances during discovery, is not an eth-
ical way to win a case.190 Despite this concern, plaintiffs must be afforded a viable
opportunity to redress wrongs. Imposing such a high standard on pleading, before
the availability of information through discovery, leaves claimants of negligent mis-
representation with little such opportunity, depriving them of their procedural due
process rights.
VII. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN
GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
The danger to plaintiff’s procedural due process rights—that plaintiffs will
improperly be left without an avenue to address their grievances—becomes relevant
when plaintiffs’ complaints are dismissed for failing to satisfy Rule 9(b). Although
often times leave to amend is granted and plaintiffs are given a second opportunity
to meet the specificity requirements of Rule 9(b), the determination is one of judicial
discretion.191 The area is governed by FRCP Rule 15(a)(2), which states the following:
187 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
188 See Ni Qian, Heightened Pleading Standard Should Be Applied in Negligent Misrep-
resentation Cases, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (Nov. 26, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://cblr.columbia
.edu/archives/12443.
189 See id.
190 See Marcus, supra note 129, at 441 (“Peering out from behind this mountain of liti-
gation, federal judges also perceived a pro-plaintiff shift in the balance of power in litigation
resulting largely from the breadth of discovery, which could impose very substantial costs
on defendants. Moreover, at least some courts said that once the plaintiff had obtained in-
formation through discovery he could do anything he wanted with it; discovery could even
become the principal objective of a lawsuit, rather than merely a device for helping resolve
it.” (footnotes omitted)).
191 See, e.g., Cont’l Cas. Co. v. United States ex. rel. Ainsworth, 68 F.2d 577, 580 (7th Cir.
1934) (“The disposition of a motion to amend is usually within the court’s discretion . . . .”);
Deasey v. City of Chicago, 105 N.E.2d 727, 730 (Ill. 1952) (“It is not prejudicial error to
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“In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s
written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice
so requires.”192
In Deasey v. City of Chicago, a state court case applying FRCP Rule 15(a)(2)
and federal law, the Illinois Supreme Court examined appellants’ contention that the
denial of their motion for leave to amend was arbitrary and an abuse of the trial
court’s discretion.193 The court explained that the proper standard for determining
whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in this circumstance was
“whether it furthers the ends of justice.”194 In recognizing that “[j]ustice is not served
by fruitless expenditure of time and effort by our courts, their officers and litigants,”195
the court stated that it may consider “the ultimate efficacy of a claim” in determining
whether leave to amend should be granted.196 Though the facts of this case were
extreme in that the court was able to determine that it was manifest on the face of
the complaint that the plaintiffs’ claims had no equity, the court held that the dis-
missal with prejudice was not an abuse of discretion as to constitute a deprivation
of procedural due process.197
In response to this holding, it is possible for a court to determine that a plaintiff
suing for negligent misrepresentation has no “lawful claim” because he did not, with
proper specificity allege a legal duty198 or the circumstances surrounding the misrep-
resentation. In this hypothetical, the court could easily come to the conclusion that
refuse an amendment unless there has been a manifest abuse of this discretion on the part of
the trial court.”).
192 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).
193 105 N.E.2d 727, 729 (Ill. 1952).
194 Id. at 730; see also Broxham v. Borden’s Farm Prods. Co., 53 F.2d 946, 947 (7th Cir.
1931).
195 Deasey, 105 N.E.2d at 730.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 729. The appellees’ original complaint alleged that the appellants and the appel-
lee, a city employer, made an agreement which amounted to a contract or a trust that appel-
lants would be repaid the amount that their salaries had been reduced when the appellee had
sufficient finances, and that appellant was then able to pay but had not. Id. at 728. The ap-
pellees’ motion to dismiss alleged nineteen grounds for dismissal, including “the failure to
set out the appropriation bills on which plaintiffs rely, laches, limitations, insufficient alle-
gations to show a contract, fraud, or any legal duty in defendant.” Id. Appellees filed a motion
for leave to amend their complaint “for the purpose of making additional parties parties-
complainant, and for other purposes.” Id. The appellant agreed with appellees that “the com-
plaint does not, and cannot, state a good cause of action because it has already been held that
appellants have no lawful claims,” holding “[a]ppellants presented no proposed amendment
in seeking to amend and the court was justified in assuming that no amendment could have
rejuvenated their dead claims.” Id. at 729–30.
198 Although some authorities argue that the elements of the tort do not need to be stated
with specificity pursuant to Rule 9(b), other holdings are unclear as to what allegations would
satisfy. See Marcus, supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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the plaintiff could be successful in amending the complaint in these areas and should
be allowed to in order to further the ends of justice. On the other hand, it is also pos-
sible that the trial court, in considering the “ultimate efficacy of a claim,” could
conclude that the plaintiff probably would not be successful and dismiss the case
with prejudice. The appellate court, unwilling to determine an abuse of discretion,
the highest standard of appellate review, upholds the dismissal with prejudice, and
the plaintiff’s possibly meritorious claim is lost. The determination of the survival of
a plaintiff’s complaint, defective but with the potential to state a good cause of action,
is too crucial to be trusted with judicial discretion, as it is plaintiff’s sole opportunity
for redress. Because complaints are submitted before plaintiffs are afforded the ben-
efits of discovery and sufficient time to develop their arguments to meet their full
potential, it would be a great deprivation of procedural due process to dismiss their
claims—potentially arbitrarily—at such an early stage.
It should be stated that “[d]ismissals made pursuant to . . . Rule [9(b)], however,
are ‘almost always’ accompanied by a grant of leave to amend, unless the plaintiff
has had a prior opportunity to amend its complaint or the allegations were made
after full discovery in a related case.”199 In a decision from the Second Circuit, the
court held that the plaintiff was required to plead its negligent misrepresentation
claim in accordance with the specificity criteria of Rule 9(b), but failed to allege
with specificity any representation made by the defendants to induce its action or “a
special relationship between the parties so as to give rise to a duty of care,” thereby
failing to state a claim under New York law.200 The court, in concluding that leave
to amend should be granted on the issue of negligent misrepresentation, stated that
it could not “state with certainty” that amendment would be futile.201 The court
stated, “[i]f [plaintiff] is able to cite specific representations made by [defendants]
for the purpose of inducing it to enter the contract, the elements needed to establish
a relationship of near-privity may be met.”202
The Aetna court also considered the relevance of the discovery process in
whether summary judgment should be granted in regards to certain claims203 and
whether dismissal with leave to amend should be granted in others.204 In arguing that
199 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 581 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1986)).
200 Id. at 584.
201 Id. (“Leave to amend may be denied following a Rule 9(b) dismissal if an amendment
would be futile.” (citing Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1996))).
202 Id. The difficulty of satisfying these requirements has been discussed in Part VI.
203 Id. at 595 (“General argues that, because it is an ‘outsider’ in this litigation, it should
be entitled to further discovery before summary judgment may be granted as to this claim.
I noted in my prior opinion that ‘a bare assertion that the evidence supporting a plaintiff’s
allegation is in the hands of the defendant is insufficient . . .’ to warrant a denial of summary
judgment on the grounds that further discovery is necessary.” (quoting Contemporary Mission,
Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 648 F.2d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 1981))).
204 Id. at 584.
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summary judgment should not be granted against Aetna in respect to defendant’s
cross-claims, Aetna argued that it required additional discovery to respond properly
to the motion pursuant to Rule 56:
(d) When Facts Are Unavailable to the Nonmovant. If a non-
movant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified rea-
sons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the
court may:
(1) defer considering the motion or deny it;
(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take
discovery; or
(3) issue any other appropriate order.205
The court ultimately held that, “[w]hile it is true that caution should be exercised
in granting summary judgment when the nonmoving party lacks relevant discovery,
Aniero has not made a sufficient showing [pursuant to Rule 56(f)] that this is the
case here.”206
In assessing whether a defendant’s fraudulent inducement claim should be dis-
missed with leave to amend or with prejudice, for failure to satisfy Rule 9(b), the court
was required to undergo a separate analysis of the level of discovery completed ab-
sent the applicability of Rule 56.207 The court stated that inquiry may include whether
the plaintiff had a proper opportunity to amend its complaint or allegations after full
discovery in a related case, or if discovery had “barely begun” or “very little” was
completed at the time motions were filed.208 The court, in granting leave to amend
defendants’ fraudulent inducement claim, explained an important rationale: “[T]he
liberal provisions for amendment under the Federal Rules are restricted following
the filing of a motion for summary judgment and the completion of discovery.”209
The decision demonstrated the court’s belief in the importance of the survival of a
claim pre-discovery, as evidenced by the goals of the Federal Rules, in which a too-
stringent dismissal may potentially give rise to a procedural due process claim.
205 FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
206 Aetna, 404 F.3d at 573 (citing Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1983)).
Further, the court explained that “to oppose a motion on the basis of Rule 56(f), a party must
file an affidavit detailing: (1) what facts are sought and how they are to be obtained; (2) how
these facts are reasonably expected to create a genuine issue of material fact; (3) what efforts
the affiant has made to obtain those facts; and (4) why these efforts were unsuccessful.” Id.
at 606 (citing Sage Realty Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 34 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 1994)).
207 Id. at 580.
208 Id. at 581.
209 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Ansam Assocs., Inc. v. Cola Petroleum Ltd., 760 F.2d
442, 446 (2d Cir. 1985)). The court also granted the defendants leave to amend their negli-
gent misrepresentation claim because the court did “not believe the filing of an amended
complaint would be futile as to [the] claim.” Id. at 584.
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VIII. THE HISTORICAL EXTENSION OF RULE 9(B) TO NON-FRAUD-BASED CLAIMS
& THE INCREASING STRICTNESS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE ITSELF
The historical extension of Rule 9(b) to non-fraud-based claims and the increas-
ing strictness in the application of the Rule itself make heightened pleading a danger-
ous instrument for defendants and courts in the dismissal of claims.210 The availability
of the tort of negligent misrepresentation is often already limited for plaintiffs who
do not meet the applicable privity standard or the requirement of economic loss.211
Combined with a standard of heightened pleading that is unclear and being applied
with increasing severity, the restrictions on the tort may make it virtually unavail-
able to plaintiffs in future years.
A. The Uncertainty of Negligent Misrepresentation as a “Tort”
First, courts’ too-strict privity-like requirements for the tort combined with the
increasing quantity of information available to the public in the modern era demon-
strate the possibility of a difficult future for plaintiffs who seek recovery for negli-
gent misrepresentation.212 The unsteady footing that negligent misrepresentation
possesses in many jurisdictions is evident from the history of the tort. Negligent
misrepresentation was not solidly in existence before Justice Cardozo’s Ultramares
decision in 1931.213 Sixty years after Ultramares, in the early 1990s, legal authors
criticized the then-current cause of action, with privity standards such as “special
relationship,” as one based in contract instead of in tort.214 The authors instead called
for the application of tort principles, particularly foreseeability, which would con-
template contemporary business relationships and lift the tort out of its “minor role”
in the laws of those jurisdictions.215 One author in New York, sixty years after the
210 See infra Parts VIII.A–B.
211 See supra Part II.
212 See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text.
213 Michael D. Lieder, Constructing a New Action for Negligent Infliction of Economic
Loss: Building on Cardozo and Coase, 66 WASH. L. REV. 937, 948 (1991) (citing Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931)) (“The action for negligent misrep-
resentation developed largely out of several decisions of the New York Court of Appeals,
culminating in the 1931 decision in Ultramares.”).
214 See Richard D. Holahan, Jr., Note, Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat
Marwick Main & Co.: Just in Case You Had Any Doubts—There Is No Tort of Negligent
Misrepresentation in New York, 13 PACE L. REV. 763, 813–14 (1993); Philip Steven Horne,
Note, Onita Pacific Corp. v. Trustees of Bronson: The Oregon Supreme Court Recognizes
the Negligent Misrepresentation Tort, 72 OR. L. REV. 753, 754 (1993).
215 See Holahan, supra note 214, at 812–14 (arguing that “[b]y expanding liability for neg-
ligent misrepresentation to all reasonably foreseeable third parties, while simultaneously ex-
cising joint and several liability, the legislature could provide an equitable result for both the
accountants and third parties involved”); Horne, supra note 214, at 767.
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Ultramares decision, went so far as to remark that a recent decision in the jurisdic-
tion applying the contract-based privity restrictions dictated that “[t]here is no tort
of negligent misrepresentation in New York.”216 Privity requirements were signifi-
cantly more restricted than contemplated for the tort under the Restatement.217 At
that time, approximately only thirty jurisdictions recognized any tort of negligent
misrepresentation.218 Since the 1990s, the advent of the World Wide Web and the
prevalence of the Information Age in the lives of consumers have undoubtedly in-
creased the possibility of third party liability, and, consequently, transformed the
nature of the tort.219
B. The Increasing Severity with Which Rule 9(b) Is Applied
Second, the rule of heightened pleading itself is similarly under established,
both in the severity with which it is applied and in the causes of action in which it
governs, offering little guidance to potential plaintiffs.220 There have been several
instances in which federal courts assessing fraud claims have gone beyond the lim-
ited text of Rule 9(b) and have required even more heightened pleading, resulting
in an increase in motion practices under the Rule.221 “Clearly, the use of heightened
pleading increases the risk of erroneous dismissal of valid claims.”222 The third edi-
tion of Federal Practice and Procedure suggests that the Rule, which only requires
216 Holahan, supra note 214, at 770. Holahan further argues:
[i]n sum, the practical significance of Security Pacific is that in New
York, in order for a nonclient to successfully assert negligent misrep-
resentation against an accountant, it must show that it is a third-party
beneficiary to the audit contract. Under Security Pacific, the bounds of
the negligent misrepresentation cause of action are coterminous with
those of contract law.
Id. at 805 (citing Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080
(1992)).
217 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). Horne argues, “[t]his scope of lia-
bility seems more restrictive than the Restatement’s actually foreseen reliance scope of
liability.” Horne, supra note 214, at 766.
218 Horne, supra note 214, at 753.
219 See, e.g., Deborah A. Ballam, The Expanding Scope of the Tort of Negligent Misrep-
resentation: Are Publishers Next?, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 761 (1989) (predicting the tort’s
expansion in future years).
220 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, at § 1297 (“In recent years, the application of Rule 9(b)
has become more demanding for certain types of cases and in certain federal courts.”).
221 See id. for an analysis of the factors contributing to the “increased attention to the plead-
ing of fraud.” “[S]tatutory developments and judicial changes in attitude undoubtedly reflect
the federal courts’ understanding of the congressional intent underlying a statute, a reaction
to the increased numbers of these types of cases, or a desire to filter out at an early stage
what are perceived to be frivolous cases.” Id.
222 Fairman, supra note 129, at 295.
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that the “circumstances” surrounding the fraud such as the “time, place, and contents
of the false representations or omissions, as well as the identity of the person making
the misrepresentation or failing to make a complete disclosure and what that defendant
obtained thereby” to be subject to heightened pleading, has been extended by some
federal judges “who require more particularity on a greater range of subjects.”223
Thus, lawyers should “plead all of the elements of fraud and . . . do so in some detail
whenever that is possible” in order to avoid dismissal of their claims.224 Further-
more, the authors argue that even the explicit application of heightened pleading to
“circumstances” of fraud should be interpreted more flexibly under the Rule:
[I]t is inappropriate to focus exclusively on the fact that Rule 9(b)
requires particularity in pleading the circumstances of fraud. This
is too narrow an approach and fails to take account of the gen-
eral simplicity and flexibility contemplated by the federal rules
and the many cases construing them; in a sense, therefore, the
rule regarding the pleading of fraud does not require absolute
particularity or a recital of the evidence, especially when some
matters are beyond the knowledge of the pleader and can only be
developed through discovery.225
C. The Expansion of Rule 9(b) to Non-Fraud-Based Claims
Third, the scope of Rule 9(b) in regards to the causes of action which it governs
has spanned outside of “fraud.”226 Patent claims that sound in fraud are subject to the
requirements of the Rule, and causes of action which are not fraud but are premised
on fraudulent conduct also require heightened pleading.227 The Rule has even ap-
plied to claims which are not based in fraud.228 For example, consider Fairman’s
argument regarding the extension of Rule 9(b) to non-fraud-based claims:
Federal procedure could tolerate the deadweight of Rule 9(b) if
it were limited to its own short list. But 9(b) is not so benign.
Instead, its malignant pleading requirement spreads to other
claims that courts deem “fraud-like.” Thus, Rule 9(b)’s height-
ened pleading now infects such “quasi-fraud” claims as statutory
civil rights violations, defamation suits, and CERCLA actions.229
223 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, at § 1297.
224 Id.; see also supra Part I.
225 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, at § 1298 (footnotes omitted).
226 See Fairman, supra note 129, at 282.
227 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, at § 1297.
228 Fairman, supra note 129, at 282.
229 Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Thus, federal courts have extended Rule 9(b) in two ways: (1) in the scope of
the types of claims which it governs, and (2) in the application of its heightened
pleading requirements. Courts have also developed a very limited tort of negligent
misrepresentation, often restricting the tort to contract-based theories and failing to
implement a foreseeability standard more appropriate for the modern age. In order
to effectuate a process conducive to the survival of negligent misrepresentation
claims which may have merit, courts must clarify the tort, preferably through the
reasonable expansion of privity standards, and determine that Rule 9(b) does not
apply to these claims. Without a change in the legal environment, plaintiffs will be
left without a remedy for the tort.
CONCLUSION
The current circuit split regarding the applicability of Rule 9(b) to negligent
misrepresentation claims must be resolved in favor of potential plaintiffs by limiting
heightened pleading to claims of fraud. The continual extension of Rule 9(b) has
been a result of defendants’ and courts’ manipulation of procedural rules in order
to eliminate liability through dismissal. Although pleading requirements may not be
completely outcome-determinative, as judges should give plaintiffs the opportunity
to amend their complaints, the inquiries courts have taken in determining whether
to grant leave to amend, and the subsequent, strict appellate standard of review of
judicial discretion are insufficient protections for the crucial procedural due process
interest at stake.
The inquiry, which involves some determination of the ultimate success of the
claim based on its merits and some consideration of the level of completed discovery,
may seem rational in relation to the goal of the Federal Rules: liberally allowing plain-
tiffs sufficient opportunity to address their grievances. However, combined with the
application of Rule 9(b) heightened pleading to the tort of negligent misrepresentation,
the inconsistency with which courts have applied the Rule itself, and the failure of the
justifications for Rule 9(b)’s displacement of the more liberal Rule 8 notice pleading,
plaintiffs’ claims are continuing to fail to pass muster in state and federal courts.
The solution is uniformity. Clarity on the tort of negligent misrepresentation
must be achieved through the limitation of Rule 9(b) to claims of fraud, a fundamen-
tally different tort. This solution should be achieved through the Rules Committee’s
amendment of the Rule, limiting the Rule’s application by inserting the exclusive
language of what constitutes fraud, or by Supreme Court review on the issue. Until
heightened pleading can be confined to the original tort for which it was intended to
apply, potential plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights will be continually threatened.
